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Co-Predatory Rule:  
International Cooperation with 
Respect to Cryptocurrency Taxation 
in Russia and Belarus 
 
 
This article presents an example of how globalization and digitization force states 
to rely on international organization. Examining tax policy with respect to 
cryptocurrency—an innovative, global technology—the implication is that a state 
levying taxes on cryptocurrency must turn to international monitoring and 
enforcement regimes to support effective taxation. Based on Margaret Levi’s theory 
of predatory rule, I submit a theory of “co-predation” to explain international 
cooperation with respect to taxation of novel, cross-border technologies such as 
cryptocurrency. The Automatic Exchange of Information (AEOI), an anti-tax 
evasion framework promulgated by the OECD, serves as an example of 
international cooperation. A comparison of cryptocurrency taxation in Russia and 
Belarus finds that, where effective tax policy is at stake, states are enjoined to 
commit to international cooperation through AEOI. The article concludes by 
considering implications for legitimacy, quasi-voluntary compliance, and strategic 
tax policy. 
 
 
Jim Mignano 
Portland State University 
 
 
Introduction 
 
We live in a global era. Money and communications traverse the planet at 
the stroke of a button. Travelers reach remote corners of the world in fractions of 
the time and effort of mere decades ago. Consumers have goods from nearly 
anywhere delivered to their doorstops. Businesses search for markets and labor 
across borders, while migrants bring once distant cultures into close proximity. 
Nonetheless, whereas society across the world may be more connected than ever 
before, our understanding of the state in such an era is fraught with contention. 
Scholars debate the extent to which globalization changes relationships between 
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states, intergovernmental organizations, and global civil society. Some observers 
argue that states may be growing closer in contact, but the state itself is adapting 
and developing new ways of exerting power. Others argue that the consequences 
of globalization necessitate forms of governance and coordination beyond the 
capacity of the state. This article presents evidence of the latter. 
 
In this article, I highlight how technological innovation influences 
relationships among states. The consequences of globalization and technological 
innovation go hand in hand. If globalization increases the proximity of states to one 
another, technological innovation—specifically digitization—changes the flow of 
information among states and between the state and society. Precisely, then, what 
are the implications of globalization and digitization for the state? I argue that 
globalization and digitization force the state to rely on international organization. 
The emergence of cryptocurrency exemplifies this dynamic. Cryptocurrencies are 
digital payment systems that use cryptography to operate securely without a third-
party intermediary. The first cryptocurrency, Bitcoin, was released in 2009 and has 
inspired the development of thousands of others. As of December 2018, there were 
at least 35 million cryptocurrency users worldwide.1 
 
By altering financial channels and obscuring information flows, 
cryptocurrency disrupts conventional taxation mechanisms, compelling states to 
turn to international regimes for support. Specifically, individuals and nonstate 
actors may use foreign cryptocurrency holdings to evade taxation. In response, 
states turn to international regimes such as the “Automatic Exchange of 
Information” to share information with one another and combat tax evasion. 
Otherwise, states must resort to domestic coercion or ideological manipulation to 
maintain revenue objectives. To explain why, I develop and test a theory of “co-
predation,” extending Margaret Levi’s theory of predatory rule to the international 
arena. “Co-Predatory Rule” explains when states cooperate to maximize revenues, 
as globalization and digitization threaten the effectiveness of traditional taxation 
mechanisms. The implication is significant: when technological innovations such 
as cryptocurrency subvert the state’s capacity to raise revenue, the state must take 
dramatic measures to adapt or risk becoming outmoded in the 21st century. 
 
Literature Review: Globalization and Taxation 
 
Globalization is a contested concept in the literature. Beginning with a 
definition of globalization, Mauro Guillen (2001) summarizes major fault lines in 
 
1 Michel Rauchs, Apolline Blandin, Kristina Klein, Gina Pieters, Martino Recanatini, and Bryan 
Zhang, 2nd Global Cryptoasset Benchmarking Study. (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Centre for 
Alternative Finance, December 12, 2018), 10, https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3306125 
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debate. If globalization is “a process leading to greater interdependence and mutual 
awareness (reflexivity) among economic, political, and social units in the world, 
and among actors in general,” (236) paramount is the question of whether or not 
globalization is “really happening.” Those who argue in the affirmative point 
largely to “increasing cross-border flows of goods, services, money, people, 
information, and culture” (236). Skeptics argue that globalization is overstated and 
nothing new. Some observe that international trade, for example, is concentrated in 
a handful of countries and remains but a fraction of total national economic activity. 
If one grants that globalization is happening, a series of questions unfolds: do state 
policies converge? Does globalization undermine states’ authority? Is there a 
substantive difference between globality and modernity? Is a global culture 
emerging? Assuming that yes, globalization is really happening, my analytical 
point of departure is the nexus between globality and modernity, exemplified by 
cryptocurrency. Cryptocurrency is a fitting example because it operates both 
globally and digitally. As such, it presents an illuminating case through which to 
probe these questions. 
 
Virginie Guiradon and Gallya Lahav (2000) explore the effect of 
international regimes on state decision making and thus speak directly to the 
question of whether globalization threatens national sovereignty. Guiradon and 
Lahav examine the case of migration control in Germany, France, and the 
Netherlands, evaluating how international legal norms impact state behavior and 
how states respond in turn. Specifically, international human rights norms 
promoting family unity and condemning inhumane treatment have been at odds 
with state deportation policy. Guiradon and Lahav (164) find that states adapt to 
such international constraints by “[devolving] decision making in monitoring and 
execution upward to intergovernmental fora, downward to elected local authorities, 
and outward to private actors.” Although it took decades in each of the three 
national cases, significant pressure on states unfolded through “international 
cooptation” (171-175). Attempting to constrain national migration control, national 
judiciaries—supported by domestic interest groups—referred to international 
human rights standards promulgated by the European Court of Human Rights. In 
response, states circumvented such pressures by shifting the locus of migration 
control. While their finding implies a shift of national sovereignty, Guiradon and 
Lahav (165) offer a more sophisticated interpretation: this form of devolution is 
“sharing competence,” ceding some autonomy “to meet national policy goals, 
regaining sovereignty in another sense: capabilities to rule.” This analysis considers 
the extent to which states behave with respect to cryptocurrency as predicted by 
Guiradon’s and Lahav’s findings. 
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Turning from the literature on globalization to the literature on taxation, I 
consider Margaret Levi’s (1988) Of Rule and Revenue. Levi’s theory of “predatory 
rule” illuminates a central goal to which states are oriented, as well as a set of 
constraints that state elites face in pursuit of that goal. For, as Levi (10) asserts, 
“Rulers maximize revenue to the state, but not as they please.” The premise is that 
state elites act rationally in pursuit of their goals, which necessitates the objective 
to accumulate resources in the form of tax revenue. In short, to spend, states must 
raise money. In Levi’s (3) words, “rulers are predatory in that they try to extract as 
much revenue as they can from the population.” Based on this imperative, Levi 
devises two general forms of relationship between ruler and ruled: the state as a 
collective good provider and the state as a “protection racket.” (“Protection racket” 
is Levi’s (11) colorful way of describing state tax policy that involves no provision 
of goods or services other than withholding the heavy hand of the state in exchange 
for compliance.) History is replete with states taking both forms, Levi finds, and 
often involves some combination of the two. 
 
The forms a state takes in relation to its subjects, and ultimately its ability 
to maximize state revenue, rests on six constraints its rulers face. Levi divides the 
constraints into two categories: structural constraints and behavioral constraints.2 
Three structural constraints situate rulers in decision-making environments that 
shape rulers’ incentives and the information at their disposal. First, “productive 
forces and economic structure” reflect the state of a nation’s economy, including 
the relations and influence of land, labor, and capital interests. Productive forces 
also influence the array of material goods the state is expected to supply its subjects. 
Second, “international context” recognizes that states do not operate in a vacuum 
but are subject to external pressures and inducements, primarily through 
competition with other states. In this respect, elements such as trade, international 
investment, and regulatory arbitrage may serve to extend or constrict a state’s total 
revenue base. Third, “form of government” dictates the range of choices available 
to state leaders. Government form places constraints on state leaders given their 
principal-agent roles, the character of political rivalry, and the array of compliance 
measures at their disposal. 
 
The second, behavioral, set of constraints encompasses state leaders’ 
relative bargaining power, discount rates, and transaction costs. Relative bargaining 
power is in part a function of the first three structural constraints. That is, economic 
structure, international dynamics, and government form influence the position of 
state leaders vis-à-vis other influential actors and constituents. Nonetheless, Levi 
(18-20) describes how state leaders can enhance their relative bargaining power by 
 
2 This review does not fully elaborate the details of each constraint—for there are many—but 
focuses on the factors most at play in state behavior with respect to globalization and digitization. 
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accumulating coercive resources (through law, police, and courts), economic 
resources (through ownership and control of the means of production), and political 
resources (through maintaining discipline in their ranks and immobilizing 
opposition). Levi’s (23) transaction costs “are the positive costs of bargaining a 
policy and of implementing a policy once it has been bargained.” With respect to 
revenue maximization, transaction costs are especially significant and take the 
forms of “measuring revenue sources, monitoring compliance, using agents and 
other middlemen, punishing the noncompliant, and creating quasi-voluntary 
compliance” (23). 
 
Levi’s concept of quasi-voluntary compliance is particularly illuminating. 
A mechanism for lowering transaction costs, Levi distinguishes quasi-voluntary 
compliance from costlier mechanisms for maximizing revenue to the state, such as 
coercion (with high monitoring and enforcement costs) and normative congruence 
(which depends on the state’s ability to capitalize on constituents’ extra-rational 
motives such as ideology). Quasi-voluntary compliance is “voluntary because 
taxpayers choose to pay” and is “quasi-voluntary because the noncompliant are 
subject to coercion—if they are caught” (52). Quasi-voluntary compliance rests on 
taxpayers’ expectations that “rulers will keep their bargains” and “the other 
constituents will keep theirs” (53). In other words, as rational actors, taxpayers 
expect material benefits from the state in return for paying taxes. Material benefits 
may be public (such as peace, safety, and security; economic stability and 
development; and natural resource management), private (such as patronage or sale 
of office), or some combination thereof. Taxpayers also expect fairness: that their 
compatriots will pay their fair share and those who do not will be forced to pay or 
be punished. 
 
State leaders may reinforce taxpayers’ expectations of material benefit 
through what Levi (61) calls “precommitment” and “conditional cooperation.” 
Precommitment may take the form of leaders publicizing binding budgets, 
investing in public goods up-front, and in democratic regimes, subjecting 
themselves to regular electoral contests. Conditional cooperation holds leaders 
accountable to each other and finds a natural home in regular, public legislative 
deliberation. State leaders may also reinforce taxpayers’ confidence in their 
compatriots through “selective incentives,” “conditional cooperation,” and 
“coordination and loyalty” (64-67). Selective incentives include tax breaks, 
subsidies, or protections for key taxpayers who may otherwise avoid taxation. As a 
form of conditional cooperation, the state may devolve monitoring and enforcement 
functions to lower administrative units or even nonstate actors. Finally, the state 
may coordinate taxpayers and encourage loyalty by informing its constituents about 
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high compliance rates, publicly punishing noncompliance, and promoting the 
goods and services it provides in exchange for tax compliance. 
 
It is worth noting two nuances of quasi-voluntary compliance: the use of 
focusing events and its relationship to legitimacy cultivation. First, the provision of 
benefits associated with state leaders “keeping their bargains” need not be 
considered a pure constraint on rulers. Levi (57) observes that rulers throughout 
history have capitalized on—or even manufactured—focusing events such as war, 
economic crisis, and natural disaster to shape the benefits the state provides to their 
own preferences (perhaps at odds with those of the taxpayers). Second, Levi (68) 
sees quasi-voluntary compliance as a way of conceptualizing legitimacy, defined 
as “generalized consent to rules of conformity enforced by rulers on the polity.” 
The significance of Levi’s conceptualization cannot be overstated, because as Levi 
demonstrates, rulers may cultivate legitimacy through the mechanisms used to 
manufacture quasi-voluntary compliance. 
 
The Theory of Co-Predation 
 
The theory I submit is built in part on Guiradon’s and Lahav’s contributions 
to our understanding of the state and globalization. Guiradon’s and Lahav’s 
framework of international constraints and state devolutionary response is useful in 
that cryptocurrency poses challenges to the state for which it is not equipped to 
confront alone. With respect to cryptocurrency, however, Guiradon’s and Lahav’s 
analysis underappreciates the extent to which pressures such as digitization 
fundamentally threaten states’ “capabilities to rule.” To address this shortcoming, 
I reformulate Levi’s theory of predatory rule to accommodate the sweeping change 
digitization has wrought since Of Rule and Revenue was penned. The theory of “co-
predation” extends Levi’s framework to accommodate cryptocurrency’s effects on 
information flows and inherently transnational nature. It may also shed light on how 
states manage the economic and political implications of digitization more broadly. 
 
“Co-Predatory Rule” explains when states cooperate to maximize revenues, 
as globalization and digitization threaten the effectiveness of traditional taxation 
mechanisms. In this analysis, cryptocurrency alters the structural and behavioral 
constraints of Levi’s theory of predatory rule such that international regimes—
collections of international laws, norms, and organizations specific to a particular 
set of international affairs—become necessary to generate quasi-voluntary 
compliance. States can no longer “go it alone” with respect to maximizing revenue, 
at least if they choose not to rely on coercion or ideology. They must conscript other 
states as co-predators to uphold monitoring and enforcement mechanisms involved 
in quasi-voluntary compliance. 
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Three characteristics of cryptocurrency complicate the state’s ability to 
maximize revenue: globality, pseudonymity, and ideology. Cryptocurrency’s 
globality and pseudonymity are problematic for taxation because they inhibit 
information flow to the state, complicating measurement, monitoring, and 
enforcement. Ideologies associated with cryptocurrency, such as “crypto-
anarchism,”3 are problematic for quasi-voluntary compliance because they 
represent wholesale dissent on the part of constituents. 
 
Cryptocurrencies are global by design. Anyone with Internet access may 
use cryptocurrency to transact with any other user across the globe. As anyone who 
has sent money from one country to another can attest, cross-border payments are 
not typically seamless and usually bear substantial transaction costs. 
Cryptocurrencies are able to skirt barriers and lower transaction costs by operating 
“peer-to-peer,” that is, without involving third-party financial intermediaries. A 
significant corollary is that, because users can pseudonymously transact with 
cryptocurrency, they can use it to subvert national capital controls and thwart 
financial sanctions. Cryptocurrency is thus a striking example of digitization—
converting analog information into digital information so computers can process 
and transmit it—employing modern cryptography to enable its covert use. 
 
Consequently, the theory of co-predation addresses cryptocurrency’s 
globality and digitality in understanding states’ constraints with respect to taxation. 
The fact that cryptocurrency users a) may be earning income in another jurisdiction 
and b) may not be known to the state constitutes a form of information failure which 
complicates the state’s ability to tax such users. Following Levi’s model, the state 
may resort to coercion, ideological manipulation, or quasi-voluntary compliance. 
Coercion is relatively straightforward but bears significant monitoring and 
enforcement costs because it effectively relies on outlawing cryptocurrency. Such 
heavy-handedness also potentially diminishes the state’s legitimacy in the eyes of 
those attracted specifically to cryptocurrency and technology or more generally, 
liberal human rights norms. Ideological manipulation shares similar risks to those 
of coercion, but targets a relatively small proportion of taxpayers who are extra-
rationally motivated. That is, such users would be expected to pay taxes, not out of 
self-interest, but out of some normative kinship with the state and its aims.4 For a 
state to create quasi-voluntary compliance with respect to cryptocurrency taxation, 
it must delegate a significant share of its monitoring and enforcement activities to 
 
3 See Annex: Crypto-Anarchism. 
4 Further complicating the state’s incentives to manipulate ideology with respect to cryptocurrency 
is attracting attention to the ideological basis of cryptocurrency itself, which is wholly at odds with 
the modern nation-state. See Annex: Crypto-Anarchism. 
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nonstate actors and other states. In the cryptocurrency environment, nonstate actors 
such as cryptocurrency “wallet” services and exchanges (akin to banks and 
investment brokerages) are able to collect user identities to peel back the veil of 
anonymity. In turn, states may collect users’ financial information from 
cryptocurrency services and exchanges, and transmit relevant tax information to 
their counterparts. This analysis applies the theory to examine such construction of 
quasi-voluntary compliance through states’ commitment to the Standard for 
Automatic Exchange of Financial Account Information in Tax Matters (or 
“Automatic Exchange of Information,” AEOI). 
 
Alternative Explanations of Co-Predation 
 
Before applying the theory, it is worth exploring several alternative 
explanations of the impact of digitization on the state. The first takes ontological 
issue with the dynamic of co-predation, conceiving international regimes as mere 
epiphenomena of the state. In this line of reasoning, any form of co-predation does 
not mean that global or digital pressures are outmoding the state; on the contrary, 
the ability of the state to adapt by enjoining reciprocal relationships with other states 
is a testament to the state’s persistent ability to pursue its own interest through 
multiple means. To the extent that we observe international regimes appear to 
evolve on their own, particularly when doing so may be at odds with state interests, 
this argument falls short. 
 
A second argument depends on cryptocurrency’s future. For some, 
cryptocurrency is a mere fad, momentarily drawing attention due to speculative 
frenzy: it is prone to collapse and certainly does not threaten the state. To be sure, 
the technology is young, and its staying power remains to be shown, but states have 
begun to take note. Bitcoin is perhaps the most widely recognized cryptocurrency 
and offers a glimpse of the magnitude of cryptocurrency on world markets. While 
Bitcoin has captured the popular imagination and reaches a market capitalization 
of approximately $180 billion, there are over 5,000 other cryptocurrencies traded 
today.5 
 
Finally, there is a compelling argument that the AEOI is an imprecise 
analytical measure. Cryptocurrency taxation is a targeted activity, whereas the 
AEOI applies broadly to financial instruments. Indeed, the bulk of tax information 
transmitted through AEOI is likely unrelated to cryptocurrency activities. Using the 
 
5 “Top 100 Cryptocurrencies by Market Capitalization,” CoinMarketCap, April 26, 2020, 
https://coinmarketcap.com/. By comparison, if Bitcoin traded as a publicly listed corporation, it 
would be the 55th largest in the world by market capitalization, on par with Paypal. However, 
Bitcoin prices are highly volatile, often rising or falling by double digit percentages in a single day. 
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AEOI in this respect is a blunt instrument, but until we have better measures of 
cryptocurrency activities, it may help move analysis further along. For the time 
being, applying the theory of co-predation to cryptocurrencies and the AEOI 
provides insight into conditions that compel states to cooperate and into specific 
reasons why states may be enjoined to take cryptocurrency seriously. 
 
Crypto-Friendly States and Automatic Exchange of Information 
 
In 2013, the G20 requested that the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD) develop and implement a global standard for combating 
tax evasion through information sharing. The OECD followed suit by designing the 
AEOI and began implementing it in 2017. Xavier Oberson (2012, 7) describes the 
AEOI as an international framework of reciprocal intergovernmental agreements to 
systematically and regularly collect and transmit “taxpayer information by the 
source country to the residence country concerning various categories of income.” 
In effect, the AEOI distributes the burden of monitoring and enforcements among 
participating countries, through OECD coordination. As of February 2020, of the 
170 United Nations member states wherein cryptocurrency is legal,6 79 have 
committed to the AEOI and 91 have not (see Table 1). 
 
  
 
6 Global Legal Research Center, “Regulation of Cryptocurrency Around the World,” The Law 
Library of Congress, June 2018, https://www.loc.gov/law/help/cryptocurrency/world-survey.php. 
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Table 1. AEOI Commitment of Countries where Cryptocurrency is Legal 
AEOI 
(Yes) 
Albania 
Andorra 
Antigua and 
Barbuda 
Argentina 
Australia 
Austria 
Azerbaijan 
Bahamas 
Barbados 
Belgium 
Belize 
Brazil 
Brunei Darussalam 
Bulgaria 
Canada 
Chile 
Costa Rica 
Croatia 
Cyprus 
Czech Republic 
Denmark 
Dominica 
Ecuador 
Estonia 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Ghana 
Greece 
Grenada 
Hungary 
Iceland 
India 
Ireland 
Israel 
Italy 
Japan 
Kazakhstan 
Latvia 
Lebanon 
Liechtenstein 
Luxembourg 
Malaysia 
Maldives 
Malta 
Marshall Islands 
Mauritius 
Mexico 
Monaco 
Nauru 
Netherlands 
New Zealand 
Nigeria 
Norway 
Panama 
Peru 
Poland 
Portugal 
Romania 
Russian Federation 
Saint Kitts and 
Nevis 
Saint Lucia 
Saint Vincent and 
the Grenadines 
Samoa 
San Marino 
Seychelles 
Singapore 
Slovakia 
Slovenia 
South Africa 
South Korea 
Spain 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 
Turkey 
United Kingdom 
United States of 
America* 
Uruguay 
Vanuatu 
AEOI 
(No) 
Afghanistan 
Angola 
Armenia 
Belarus 
Benin 
Bhutan 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
Botswana 
Burkina Faso 
Burundi 
Cape Verde 
Cambodia 
Cameroon 
Central African 
Republic 
Chad 
Comoros 
Congo 
Cuba 
Democratic 
Republic of the 
Congo 
Djibouti 
El Salvador 
Equatorial Guinea 
Eritrea 
Eswatini 
Ethiopia 
Federated States of 
Micronesia 
Fiji 
Gabon 
Gambia 
Georgia 
Guatemala 
Guinea 
Guinea-Bissau 
Guyana 
Haiti 
Honduras 
Ivory Coast 
Jamaica 
Jordan 
Kenya 
Kiribati 
Kyrgyzstan 
Laos 
Liberia 
Libya 
Madagascar 
Malawi 
Mali 
Mauritania 
Moldova 
Mongolia 
Montenegro 
Myanmar 
Namibia 
Nicaragua 
Niger 
North Korea 
North Macedonia 
Palau 
Papua New Guinea 
Paraguay 
Philippines  
Rwanda 
São Tomé and 
Príncipe 
Senegal 
Serbia 
Sierra Leone 
Solomon Islands 
Somalia 
South Sudan 
Sri Lanka 
Sudan 
Suriname 
Syria 
Tajikistan 
Tanzania 
Timor-Leste 
Togo 
Tonga 
Tunisia 
Turkmenistan 
Tuvalu 
Uganda 
Ukraine 
Thailand 
Ukraine 
Uzbekistan 
Yemen 
Zambia 
Zimbabwe 
* The United States has not formally committed to the AEOI but participates in practice through its 
Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act and set of related intergovernmental agreements. 
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The table discloses little similarity within the two groupings: levels of 
economic development, government form, membership in international 
organizations, and demographics vary widely. Perhaps the most common 
characteristic in one group but not the other is the degree of financialization, as one 
may expect given the nature of the AEOI. Many countries that have committed to 
the AEOI are also home to major financial centers, unlike most of those who have 
not. Still, according to this logic countries such as Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, or Croatia 
are unlikely commitments. 
 
Recall the central claim of this article, that globalization and digitization 
force the state to rely on international regimes. In the case of cryptocurrency 
taxation, we would expect to see otherwise similar states make different 
commitments with respect to the AEOI, given differing cryptocurrency tax policy. 
Specifically, a state pursuing effective cryptocurrency taxation is more likely to 
commit to the AEOI than a state that does not pursue effective cryptocurrency 
taxation. To test this hypothesis, the rest of this analysis focuses on one pair of like 
countries: Russia and Belarus. While Russia and Belarus differ substantially in 
global influence (population, GDP, and geopolitics), their domestic political, 
economic, and social conditions are far more similar than they are different. 
Freedom House identifies both regimes as authoritarian, with low aggregate 
freedom scores (Russia at 20, Belarus at 19).7 As of 2018, GDP per capita (at 
Purchasing Power Parity) is $24,791 in Russia and $17,742 in Belarus.8 Roughly 
equal shares of each country’s labor force work in agriculture (9-10%), industry 
(23-28%), and services (63-67%). Approximately 76.4% of the Russian population 
and 71.1% of the Belarusian population use the Internet.9 In effect, the countries’ 
similarities allow us to hold four of Levi’s six constraints constant while examining 
the effects of international context and transaction costs on the differing policy 
outcomes. Thus, the analysis assumes two of the structural constraints (productive 
forces/economic structure and form of government) and two of the behavioral 
constraints (relative bargaining power and discount rates) remain constant. 
 
  
 
7 “Freedom in the World 2020: Countries and Territories,” Freedom House, 2020, 
https://freedomhouse.org/countries/freedom-world/scores. 
8 “GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2011 international $),” World Bank, 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.KD (accessed February 7, 2020). 
9 “Country Comparisons: Russia vs. Belarus,” Index Mundi, 
https://www.indexmundi.com/factbook/compare/russia.belarus (accessed February 7, 2020). 
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Russia and the Kremlin Cryptocracy 
 
Russian state behavior in the international context cannot be isolated from 
its past. A once powerful, regionally competitive empire and subsequently more 
powerful global superpower, the intimidating shadow of Russia’s past looms large 
over its tumultuous present. Moscow’s influence on the world stage is now 
overshadowed by its Cold War victors to the west and a rising China to the east. 
Once supplying Warsaw Pact partners with a variety of commercial and industrial 
goods, it now relies primarily on oil and gas exports for trade revenue. 
Contemporary stories of Russian election interference, state-supported spyware, 
and cyberwarfare employed in Georgia and Ukraine suggest that Russia has 
unabashedly turned to technology to exert international influence.10 
 
With respect to cryptocurrency, the Russian state is moving tentatively, 
having recently legalized cryptocurrency and wading into designs for its own state-
backed “cryptoruble.”11 As declining oil revenues and sanctions take their toll on 
the ruble, cryptocurrency is attracting interest from leaders and citizens alike. That 
said, Russia’s cryptocurrency industry is nascent compared with international 
frontrunners such as China and the United States. If Russians choose to trade in 
cryptocurrency, they are likely to look overseas, which is where the AEOI comes 
in. The state levies a 13% tax on personal cryptocurrency incomes and 24% on 
corporate cryptocurrency activities. Short of banning international networking or 
forcing personal financial disclosures of cryptocurrency holdings—which would 
carry substantial transaction costs—the Russian government has agreed to 
international information exchange. In terms of this analysis, Russia has become a 
co-predatory state. 
 
Belarus and Landlocked Offshoring 
 
With its reputation for a heavy hand in industrial affairs, relative isolation, 
and stalled economy, landlocked Belarus has emerged on the international scene as 
an unlikely cryptocurrency haven. Geographic and economic factors have drawn a 
disproportionately substantial number of cryptocurrency mining operations to the 
country.12 Its low temperatures year-round enable miners to pack many rigs into 
 
10 Michael Connell and Sarah Vogler, “Russia’s Approach to Cyber Warfare,” CNA Analysis & 
Solutions Occasional Papers, March 2017, https://www.cna.org/cna_files/pdf/DOP-2016-U-
014231-1Rev.pdf. 
11 Max Seddon, “Putin Considers ‘Cryptorouble’ as Moscow Seeks to Evade Sanctions,” Financial 
Times, January 1, 2018, https://www.ft.com/content/54d026d8-e4cc-11e7-97e2-916d4fbac0da. 
12 Cryptocurrency mining is a critical network process, using computing power voluntarily 
contributed by users (“miners”) to validate transactions and secure the cryptocurrency network. The 
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low-rent warehouses without needing to pay as much to keep their mining rigs cool 
as in higher temperature countries. In response to foreign investment in the local 
cryptocurrency economy, and likely to attract further investment, the Belarusian 
state has embraced the technology. 
 
In December 2017, Belarus announced a set of comprehensive measures to 
liberalize its economy with respect to cryptocurrency, calling the framework “the 
first of its kind in global scale.”13 Key features of the framework include the 
creation of an economic development zone dedicated to the technology, 
unregulated cryptocurrency fundraising, and a legal framework supporting the 
technology’s use and expansion. As part of this legal framework, Belarusian 
President Alexander Lukashenko decreed cryptocurrency incomes tax-exempt 
through 2023.14 Consequently, because Belarus does not collect taxes on 
cryptocurrency, it has little incentive to commit to the AEOI, at least with respect 
to cryptocurrency. It is perhaps unsurprising then, to find that Belarus has not 
committed to the AEOI. If anything, by doing so, Belarus would face higher 
transaction costs given the attendant obligation to monitor and report domestic 
cryptocurrency activities by residents of other countries. 
 
Conclusion 
 
To reiterate, the theory of co-predation predicts that a state pursuing 
effective cryptocurrency taxation forces it to cooperate with other states and 
nonstate actors. While Russia presents a relatively straightforward case of co-
predation, Belarus appears less concerned with raising tax revenues from 
cryptocurrencies than fostering the development of cryptocurrency. In either case, 
the implications for state sovereignty in a digital, global era are evident. To fight 
tax evasion, Russia has chosen to delegate a portion of monitoring and enforcement 
activities outside its scope of authority. It depends on foreign cryptocurrency 
services and exchanges to report holdings of its domestic users, via co-predatory 
states that are party to the AEOI. By contrast, Belarus has no need to delegate such 
authority, having chosen to liberalize an innovative sector of its economy. Unlike 
Russia, it is not engaging in co-predation with respect to cryptocurrency and AEOI. 
 
prospect of winning mining rewards in the form of newly minted cryptocurrency and transaction 
fees incentivize miners to devote computing power. 
13 Artem Tolkachev and Denis Aleinikov, “Belarus Enacts Unique Legal Framework for Crypto 
Economy Stakeholders,” Deloitte Legal, December 27, 2017, 
https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/ru/Documents/tax/lt-in-focus/english/2017/27-
12-en.pdf. 
14 Tatsiana Kulakevich, “Why Would Authoritarian Belarus Liberalize Cryptocurrencies?” The 
Monkey Cage, January 25, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-
cage/wp/2018/01/25/why-would-authoritarian-belarus-liberalize-cryptocurrencies. 
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One objection to this conclusion is that it is premature, because the AEOI is 
relatively new. That may be the case, but as of yet, there is little indication of its 
intent to commit to AEOI. Furthermore, Belarus has been party to bilateral 
automated information exchange with the United States since 2015. Among 
countries where cryptocurrency is legal, those with such intergovernmental 
agreements with the United States are far more likely to be parties to the AEOI than 
not (60 out of 77). This observation suggests that Belarus is indeed contradicting a 
norm, implying it must have a compelling reason to do so. 
 
It is also important to consider the connection Levi makes between quasi-
voluntary compliance and legitimacy. Both Russia and Belarus are authoritarian 
regimes and thus suffer from reduced legitimacy due to increased reliance on 
coercion. The Russian case may reflect an attempt to boost much-needed legitimacy 
by sharing taxation duties internationally while allowing its citizens to partake in 
the cryptocurrency economy. Where no tax revenues are (currently) at stake, 
Belarus has no need to create quasi-voluntary compliance. Rather, it appears to be 
fostering legitimacy through the symbolic construction of a state embracing 
technological innovation. Since all states seek legitimacy (as well as revenues), 
further analysis into the dynamics at play in democratic regimes of the digital age 
is merited. 
 
While this analysis focuses on co-predatory rule as a method of maximizing 
revenue, the interplay between cryptocurrency and states suggests an additional 
advantage of co-predation. If states become more concerned by cryptocurrency, tax 
policy may become instrumental. Cryptocurrency’s long-term viability depends on 
substantial network growth. That is, the value of cryptocurrency to its users depends 
in large part on how many others use it. Like “sin taxes,” which may be designed 
to reduce certain behaviors such as alcohol and tobacco consumption, an effectively 
high tax on cryptocurrency may stunt its growth by discouraging its use. Otherwise, 
the state may lose more than just its predatory monopoly. 
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Annex: Crypto-Anarchism 
 
No discussion of cryptocurrency and the state is complete without an introduction 
to “crypto-anarchism.” In 1992, three computer programmers in San Francisco 
started an online mailing list to discuss their shared interest in cryptography. The 
list grew, as hundreds joined over the next couple years and discussions ranged 
beyond technical aspects of cryptography to politics, philosophy, and everything in 
between. The community quickly became known as “cypherpunks.” Steven Levy 
writes, “In the Cypherpunk mind, cryptography is too important to leave to 
governments or even well-meaning companies.”15 Many of the cypherpunks’ 
shared interests coalesced around a unique political identity: self-described 
libertarian-leaning “crypto-anarchists.” Timothy C. May, one of the original three 
programmers, described crypto-anarchy in an early email to the list and forecast, 
“Just as the technology of printing altered and reduced the power of medieval guilds 
and the social power structure, so too will cryptologic methods fundamentally alter 
the nature of corporations and of government interference in economic 
transactions.”16 May and his contemporaries set the stage for a technological 
revolution that would pit likeminded developers against government agencies like 
the National Security Agency and powerful corporations like Equifax. Their goal 
would be digital emancipation and their weapon would be cryptography, 
cryptocurrency being one of their earliest pursuits. Many cryptocurrency 
proponents also claim that by eliminating a central monetary authority, 
cryptocurrency avoids human fallibility and political pressures to manipulate the 
money supply. For both ideological and technical reasons, cryptocurrency is not 
just a financial tool but can also be a distinct form of political dissent. 
 
15 Steven Levy, “Crypto Rebels,” WIRED, February 1, 1993, 
https://www.wired.com/1993/02/crypto-rebels. 
16 Timothy C. May, “The Crypto Anarchist Manifesto,” November 22, 1992, 
https://www.activism.net/cypherpunk/crypto-anarchy.html. 
